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Abstract The application of cost-effectiveness analysis in healthcare has become
commonplace in the US, but the validity of this approach is in jeopardy unless
the proverbial $US50000 per QALY benchmark for determining value for
money is updated for the 21st century.While the initial aim of this article was to
review the arguments for abandoning the $US50000 threshold, it quickly
turned to questioning whether we should maintain a fixed threshold at all. Our
consideration of the relevance of thresholds was framed by two important
historical considerations. First, cost-effectiveness analysis was developed for a
resource allocation exercise where a threshold would be determined endo-
genously by maximizing a fixed budget across all possible interventions and
not for piecemeal evaluation where a threshold needs to be set exogenously.
Second, the foundations of the $US50000 threshold are highly dubious, so it
would be unacceptable merely to adjust for inflation or current clinical practice.
Upon consideration of both sides of the argument, we conclude that the
arguments for abandoning the concept for maintaining a fixed threshold
outweigh those for keeping one. Furthermore, we document a variety of
reasons why a threshold needs to vary in the US, including variations across
payer, over time, in the true budget impact of interventions and in the
measurement of the effectiveness of interventions. We conclude that while
a threshold may be needed to interpret the results of a cost-effectiveness
analysis, that threshold must vary across payers, populations and even
procedures.
‘‘Cost-effectiveness analysis can skirt life valuation by relying instead on
the premise that we want our limited resources to achieve maximal benefits
(which may be set in units that we prefer not to value monetarily).’’
[Thompson and Fortress, 1980, p. 555[1]]
‘‘No definitive rules determine when the efficiency of a program is sufficient
to justify its adoption.’’
[Kaplan and Bush, 1982, p. 74[2]]
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Cost-effectiveness analysis first emerged in the
US in the mid-20th century, as a tool to directly
inform Congress on efficient procurement for
public works.[3] Although some similar methods
emerged during the 1960s,[4] cost-effectiveness
analysis did not establish itself in healthcare until
the mid 1970s.[5-7] Applications of cost-effective-
ness analysis within the US healthcare system
grew over the 1990s and remains strong.[8-10] In
the US, most cost-effectiveness analyses in health
are not conducted for government because, un-
like in other countries, such analyses are not
imposed by fiat,[11] and the perspective of cost-
effectiveness analysis reflects the decentralized
and highly privatized structure of the US health-
care system.[12-14] Despite calls to reconsider the
role of cost and cost effectiveness in the major
governmental healthcare programmes,[15] policy
makers remain reluctant to adopt it due to peren-
nial dislike of rationing from a broad range of
constituencies.[12,16]
Even if cost-effectiveness analysis remains an
academic enterprise in the US, the validity of the
approach is greatly undermined by continued
reference to a threshold that is now quite dated.
The initial purpose of this paper was to re-
consider the use of the $US50 000 cost-effective-
ness analysis threshold, with a view to either
abandon or replace it. We quickly realized there
was a wealth of academic arguments against the
$US50 000 threshold, and a literature was already
emerging on the possible updating of the thresh-
old. Based on our review of this literature, we were
quickly drawn to a more fundamental question –
shouldwe have a fixed cost-effectiveness threshold
given themany different types of health insurance
formats in the US and given that many of the
cost-effectiveness analyses conducted in the US
are for academic purposes.
1. Returning to the Fundamentals of
Evaluation
Early proponents of cost-effectiveness analysis
claimed that it circumvented the complexities of
placing a value on a life,[17] arguing that it focused
attention on the question ‘‘How may we most
effectively spend money to extend lives?’’[1] To
achieve this, a complete assessment of the
healthcare budget, or what we can refer to as
resource allocation, was required. The application
of the resource allocation problem involves con-
sidering all interventions and the aggregate
maximization of outcomes, previously life-years,
but now more commonly QALYs, are deter-
mined by the consideration of all possible allo-
cations given a fixed budget. Applying this
method, the threshold (also known in this con-
text as the shadow price or lambda) is identified
endogenously.[18]
The practical reality is that most applications
of cost-effectiveness analysis have failed to
assess the allocation of a budget across all inter-
ventions, preferring to take a piecemeal, pro-
gramme evaluation approach. The result is a series
of comparative evaluations of a small number of
interventions (usually only one or two) that are
viewed as alternatives for a specific medical con-
dition.[19] There are a number of political benefits
to the programme evaluation approach: it is in-
finitely simpler, allows evaluators to focus only
on new (costly) interventions and avoids the
politically problematic issue of disinvestment
(that is, the cancelling of a programme that has
become obsolete).[20] The programme evaluation
approach does have one significant downfall; it
requires the valuation of things that we might
‘‘prefer not to value monetarily’’[1] as it requires
that the researcher or decision maker define a
threshold of acceptability. In the absence of any
real science to consider what an appropriate
threshold might be in the US, a $US50 000 per
QALY rule of thumb emerged.
The $US50 000 per QALY threshold is still
commonly applied in the US and remarkably it is
justified in any number of ways in the literature. A
quick review of applications of cost-effectiveness
analysis in the US identified researchers ‘‘assum-
ing a $50 000/QALY threshold’’[21] so an inter-
vention can be ‘‘considered cost-effective.’’[22]
Other researchers argue that an intervention is
cost effective when it is ‘‘comparable to that of
haemodialysis (~$50 000 per QALY gained), an
oft-cited benchmark for cost-effectiveness,’’[23]
while others claim ‘‘a willingness-to-pay threshold
of $50 000/QALY,’’[24] often as part of a range,
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e.g. ‘‘willingness to pay (WTP) of $50 000 and
$100000 per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY)
gained.’’[25] Surprisingly, the threshold has been
cited irrespective of the outcome, ‘‘50 000 US
dollars/life year or quality-adjusted life year.’’[26]
Most often, many clinical applications use the
threshold on the basis of it being ‘‘commonly
cited’’[27] or ‘‘commonly used.’’[28]
2. The $US50 000 Threshold – Where did it
Come from?
While the foundations of the $US50 000
threshold ‘‘may never be known’’ (D. Neuhauser,
personal communication), Laufer[29] identifies
two possible histories: the dialysis standard
(which suggests that if society or payers are will-
ing to pay $US50 000 per QALY for dialysis, they
should be willing to pay $US50 000 per QALY for
other interventions) and the guideline approach
where explicit benchmarks and decision rules are
set.[30,31] While alternate histories of the threshold
have been made,[32] Laufer[29] correctly points out
that neither of these traditions actually constitutes
a formal justification of the $US50 000 threshold.
We find that both of these traditions can be
traced to a single source – a pioneering paper by
Kaplan and Bush[2] – but the story does not end
there. While Kaplan and Bush[2] do indeed refer
to a dialysis standard of $US50 000, they fail to
reference their source for the calculation. More
recently Hirth et al.[30] presents an interesting
discussion of the dialysis standard (often being
incorrectly cited as its source) but he, too, fails to
reveal an accurate source for the calculation.
A recent review by Grosse[32] confirms that the
dialysis standard foundation of the threshold is
myth, concluding that the ‘‘appeal of the $50 000
figure appears to lie in the convenience of a round
number rather than in the value of renal dialysis.’’
The foundation of the guideline approach to
the threshold – often incorrectly accredited to
Laupacis[33] – has an equally obscure origin. In
the original source of the guidelines, Kaplan
and Bush[2] argue for a range of acceptable
cost-effectiveness ratios, from $US20 000 to
$US100 000, and not a single threshold of accep-
tance. The range of ‘acceptable’ cost-effectiveness
ratios (see table I) would depend on other factors,
including available alternatives, yet a threshold
of less than $US20 000 would almost always be
acceptable and a threshold of greater than
$US100 000 would rarely be acceptable.
In table I we also present the Bush and
Kaplan[2] guidelines in present day prices, indi-
cating that if these were to be applied today, there
would be a large gray zone for decision making –
between $US52 142 and $US260 708. This is
within the ballpark of others who have attempted
to update the threshold for inflation,[34] to esti-
mate a new threshold from implied decision
making[35] or a re-calculation of the so-called
dialysis standard.[36] This range approach is still
very much embraced in the literature, with more
recent scholars arguing for a ‘‘soft threshold with
a reasonably well-defined lower and upper
boundary, allowing for considerations of un-
certainty, equity, or context of treatment.’’[31]
3. The $US50 000 Threshold – Time for It
to Go
In considering the case of either keeping or
abandoning the $US50 000 threshold (figure 1), it
is clear that no debate is needed as all the argu-
ments are one sided – all support abandoning the
iconic threshold. Even if one debates the founda-
tions of the threshold, the practical application
of a $US50000 limit in the threshold dates back
to at least 1992,[32] and as such is out of date.
Table I. Kaplan and Bush’s guidelines[2] in $US, year 2008 values
Cost per well-year Year 2008 values Guideline
Less than 20 000 per well-year <52142 Cost effective by current standards
20 000–100 000 per well-year 52 142–260 708 Possibly controversial but justifiable by many current examples
Greater than 100 000 per well-year >260708 Questionable in comparison with other healthcare expenditures
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Furthermore, it is now clear that the creation of
the threshold is not related to dialysis, nor is there
any study suggesting that society has a consistent
valuation of a QALY in the US, and hence,
$US50 000 is not a willingness-to-pay measure.
Indeed, based on our review of the literature, we
argue that a threshold of $US50 000 is not scienti-
fically justifiable in any way, and its use must be
abandoned.
What does abandoning the $US50 000
threshold mean in reality? It is questionable if
healthcare payers explicitly use a threshold
(or even cost-effectiveness analysis data at all) in
policy making, so why is it important to abandon
it at all? While one could take the academic
high road and argue that a baseless figure has
no role in drawing scientific conclusions, the use
(or rather abuse) of the $US50 000 threshold has
more pragmatic consequences. First, it effects
clinical practice directly (as clinicians read such
findings in their clinical journal) and via syste-
matic review and/or clinical guidelines. Second,
while payers might not use an explicit threshold,
the $US50 000 threshold and clinical guide-
lines/reviews that are based on the threshold
could lead to rationing by proxy.
If payers do want to address issues of cost
effectiveness (or are forced to by some future
healthcare reform in the US), then we argue that
there are two paths forward: search for an alter-
native, unique threshold for the US, or accept
that establishment of unique thresholds is incon-
sistent with the theory and practice of cost-
effectiveness analysis, and fully embrace a world
where thresholds are variable and, as such, need
to be customized for each setting.
4. The Argument for Finding a New
Unique Threshold
We have identified several arguments in sup-
port of a having a unique threshold in the litera-
ture (figure 2). These revolve around the intuitive
appeal of a single threshold, its ability to correct
equity concerns in healthcare financing, there
being no feasible alternative and the need for
transparency.
4.1 Intuitive Appeal
As has been well noted in the literature, the
best argument for a unique threshold is that it is
intuitively appealing to policy makers.[37] It allows
for a definitive decision for societal decision
making, i.e. which technologies should be adop-
ted and which must be rejected.[11] While this
might hold for single payer systems, it might be
unrealistic that every payer in the US would agree
on a single threshold, and certainly undermines
the competitive nature of the healthcare system –
i.e. where third-party payers need to offer com-
petitive coverage to maintain members. Further-






























Fig. 2. The case for a unique vs non-unique threshold.
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intuitive appeal, researchers should be explicit in
this assumption – referencing their results as
normative and not objectively scientific.
4.2 Equity Concerns
Given that different payers have different
capacities to pay, a decision-making policy using
a single threshold might promote equity and
fairness in the system. In the UK, it is claimed
that the application of cost effectiveness might lead
to more uniform provision of technologies[38] and
as a consequence avoid ‘postcode prescribing’.[11]
However, there is little evidence that cost-
effectiveness analysis prevents variation in prac-
tice, especially when central agencies fail to support
decisions based on cost-effectiveness analysis
with sufficient funding required to support na-
tional adoption. Again, while it might be plaus-
ible that a uniform threshold might promote
equity elsewhere, it might not work in the US
where there are so many uninsured people. Es-
tablishing treatment guidelines based on the
results of cost-effectiveness analysis in order to
promote equity in coverage would not benefit the
uninsured. The creation of such guidelines could
also act as a barrier to coverage for the uninsured
in the US if it lead to decreased price competition
among providers or served as a barrier to the
creation of low-cost insurance alternatives.
4.3 No Feasible Alternative
Given that estimating the true threshold (l)
would require a full resource allocation approach
in evaluating all interventions simultaneously,
and this is not feasible, then any estimate of the
threshold is going to be poorly estimated and
surrounded by great uncertainty. As such, a fixed
threshold might be as good as – or no worse than –
any other method to estimate the acceptability
of the cost-effectiveness ratio. However, if it is
true that our threshold is highly uncertain, then
this uncertainty must be incorporated into the
interpretation of cost-effectiveness analysis,
especially in any hypothesis testing. Acceptability
curves might allow a vehicle for this, but not ne-
cessarily in a completely transparent and intuitive
manner. If a threshold is chosen in a sea of un-
certainty, then again this must be stated in each
and every analysis to aid the interpretation of
the results.
4.4 The Need for Transparency
Some have argued that the application of a
fixed threshold within the application of cost
effectiveness is beneficial to society, in that it leads
to a consistent and transparent application of cost-
effectiveness analyses, and it clarifies the ‘rules of
the game’ so that manufacturers are aware of the
yardstick against which any new technology will
be measured, and can factor this information into
their decision making.[11] As such, industry can be
viewed as having a love-hate relationship with
standardized rules of the game; on the one hand,
pharmaceutical manufacturers enjoy the knowl-
edge of what conditions must be met but, on the
other hand, they dislike the fact that the excessive
rigidity of the approach does not handle excep-
tions well. That said, this argument suggests that it
is beneficial to find a single threshold or an alter-
native decision rule, and it is not beneficial to se-
lect an arbitrary one.[39] The blind acceptance
of the $US50000 threshold, especially among
researchers, has lead to a paucity of research on
determining appropriate thresholds. Even among
those researchers who have studied the value of
the QALY, there has been needless baggage asso-
ciated with the $US50 000 threshold, rather than a
de novo enquiry into the matter.[36]
5. The Argument Against a
Unique Threshold
While there has been a great deal of discussion
in recent years about the need to update the
threshold, less has been focused on the validity
of having a fixed threshold at all (figure 2). Here
we identify several arguments against having a
unique threshold and for having non-unique
thresholds. We find that arguments fall into four
categories: the imperfections of the piecemeal
evaluation approach, the need to correct im-
practical assumptions made in the application of
cost-effectiveness analysis, demand-side variations
and supply-side variations.
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5.1 Piecemeal Evaluation
As discussed above, the notion of a threshold
is grounded in resource allocation where a fixed
budget is distributed across all possible interven-
tions and where a threshold (l or the shadow
price) is solved for as part of – or more accurately
is a by-product of – the maximization process.
It is unfortunate that in practice this approach
is never really used, rather interventions are
evaluated in a piecemeal way. Comparing the
problem to economic analyses, the piecemeal
approach is a partial equilibrium and the re-
source allocation problem is a general equili-
brium – albeit one that ignores all non-health
sectors of the economy.[40] It has been well esta-
blished that in the presence of market failures,
partial equilibrium presents a corrupt vehicle for
welfare analysis[41] unless results are adjusted in
order to be consistent with the principles of gen-
eral equilibrium. There are two paths forward to
avoid these problems: return to the formal pro-
gramme evaluation problem or correct our
thresholds for imperfections in other markets.
We argue that within the context of the multitude
of different decision makers in the US, only the
latter is a possible alternative.
5.2 Impractical Assumptions
Many of the assumptions of cost effectiveness
are unrealistic, and when one loosens these as-
sumptions for practical purposes, a single thresh-
old becomes rather impractical. For example, the
attainment of efficiency in cost effectiveness re-
quires perfect divisibility of programmes and
constant returns to scale on all programmes,
whereby a programme may be partially imple-
mented with the same cost effectiveness asso-
ciated with full programme implementation, but
clearly this not the case. As such, the inability to
partially adopt a programme leads to variation in
the threshold.[5,42] Another assumption inherent
in cost-effectiveness analysis is that the benefits
estimate, usually QALYs, adequately captures all
the necessary benefits. Many of the objectives in
the healthcare sector are not adequately captured
in such measures,[43] nor do they account for
legal, historical or environmental factors. These
imbalances in benefits estimation have already
produced ad hoc reconsiderations of thresholds.
For example, many so-called lifestyle drugs are
compared with a much lower threshold, while
orphan drugs are often compared with a much
higher threshold. Many other corrections are
needed, but often ignored, in interpreting the
results of cost-effectiveness analysis, and cur-
rently the only perceivable way to do this is to
vary the threshold of acceptance.
5.3 Demand-Side Variation
One of the most basic premises in economics is
that preferences vary (if everyone’s opportunity
cost for goods were identical, then there would
be no benefits from trade). This needs to be
accounted for in the assessment of benefits, at
both an individual and a population subgroup
level,[44-48] and when societal preferences are
used, such variation needs to be accounted for by
variations in the threshold. Characteristics of the
target population matter also for societal valua-
tions of benefits. For example, under the ‘fair-
innings’ principle,[49] all individuals are entitled to
equal life expectancy, implying the explicit favour-
ing (i.e. differentiating thresholds) for programmes
aimed at the disadvantaged (e.g. due to age, disease
characteristics, or socio-economic status). Demand-
side variations are especially important given the
size and complexity of the US healthcare system,
and variations in demand have to be accom-
modated through variations in the threshold.
5.4 Supply-Side Variation
The large number and diversity of payers in
the US healthcare marketplace suggest that there
are also many supply-side characteristics that
need to be accounted for in the assessment of cost
effectiveness and the selection of a threshold for
an acceptable cost-effectiveness ratio. Already,
we have spoken of the different types of health-
care plans and the need for competition (both
in terms of premium, selective contracting and
coverage). It is inappropriate to think that all
forms of health insurance in the US should make
the same coverage decision, implicitly meaning
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that each insurer needs to select their own
threshold (or even different thresholds for dif-
ferent types of care). Even if one ignored the
variations across insurers, there are major varia-
tions in the US in terms of the costs of care. For
example, some regions need to pay very high
costs for labour, but reap major benefits from
economies of scale. In rural areas, the opposite
might be true. This of course would distort the
cost of services (as reflected by regional variation
in the Federal prospective payments system),
and subsequently the cost effectiveness of ser-
vices. Unless one moves to conducting a cost-
effectiveness analysis for each state or region in
the US, then one needs to differentially interpret
the results of a cost-effectiveness analysis.
6. Weighing the Case For and Against
a Unique Cost-per-QALY Threshold
in the US
The US has a unique and complex healthcare
system with many types of providers operating in
many different legal jurisdictions. While we are
certainly likely to see a movement towards amore
European-styled healthcare system, the US will
remain very different from the single provider
(e.g. the UK) or the single payer (e.g. pharma-
ceuticals in Australia) systems that rely most on
strict policy decision based on cost-effectiveness
analysis. Obviously there is benefit to the US
system from having some data on the cost effecti-
veness of programmes, but more care needs to be
taken regarding the interpretation of these data.
In weighing the arguments for and against a unique
threshold, we accept that a fixed thresholdmight be
beneficial in some countries, just not in the US.
7. Categorizing Sources of Variation
in the Threshold
If we reject the notion of a universal threshold,
but accept that cost-effectiveness ratios must be
compared with something, then methods for
customizing thresholds need to be found. In this
section, we offer a conceptualization of potential
sources of threshold variation (illustrated in
figure 3). We argue that thresholds should vary
for four key reasons: (i) variations across payers;
(ii) variations across time; (iii) budgetary impact;
(iv) effectiveness measurement.
7.1 Thresholds Vary Across Payers
Given the significant variation in the types
and nature of third-party payers in the US, this
must translate into variations in acceptable
thresholds. Payers face differences in costs, dif-
ferences in the services that they cover and/or are
available to them, major differences in patient
costs, and even differences in the premiums they
charge (and consequently the budget that is
available to them).
Variations across payers
• Differences in cost
• Differences in services
• Differences in patient mix
• Differences in premiums
Variations across time
• Inflation
• Technology and quality improvements
• Changing demographics
• Changes in clinical needs
Budgetary impact
• Projects are lumpy
• Prices are negotiated
• Plan costs differ from societal costs
• Average and marginal costs differ
Effectiveness measurement
• Efficacy and effectiveness differ
• Values of QOL and length of life differ
• Variations in time horizon
• Variation in preferences
Non-unique
threshold
Fig. 3. Sources in variation in the cost-per-QALY threshold. QOL =quality of life.
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7.2 Thresholds Vary Across Time
While we have rejected the notion of merely
updating the $US50000 threshold for inflation, it is
important to note that time does matter. In addi-
tion to inflation, thresholds need to change because
of technology and quality improvement, changes in
demographics and other changes in clinical need.
7.3 Budgetary Impact Varies
While cost-effectiveness analysis attempts to
compare costs and benefits, the included costs
may not completely reflect the actual costs faced
by a payer. As such, a payer might need to adjust
the threshold to account for bias in the cost-
effectiveness estimates. This is because projects
are lumpy (so there might be local economies or
diseconomies of scale), firms can negotiate their
prices, plan costs differ from societal costs
and there is a difference between average and
marginal costs.
7.4 Effectiveness Measurement Varies
These differences in both the process of eval-
uating the threshold and the point estimates
for values across regions translate into different
valuations for human health and incremental
changes in human health status. In addition to
differences in the cost of available goods and
services, there are regional differences in demo-
graphics and income that lead to variation in
preferences for health-related purchases. Indi-
viduals’ ranking of perceived needs, including the
need for incremental improvements in health
status, will also vary across regions.
8. Conclusions
For some, arguing against a threshold such as
$US50 000 per QALY is like arguing against the
notion that the world is flat – it should be an
argument that is easily won. Why then do many,
especially in the US, still reference it as an ac-
cepted truth? If thresholds for cost-effectiveness
analysis are to be utilized, it is critical that ade-
quate attention is given to justify the number
chosen and, more importantly, the assumptions
and limitations of that number. Internationally,
only a limited number of government agencies
have been explicit with their thresholds or ac-
ceptable ranges of cost effectiveness[50] and even
fewer offer a scientific justification for why their
threshold was chosen.
The benefits of a unique threshold include its
intuitive appeal and transparency, which provide
the developer and manufacturer of a new tech-
nology with an understanding of what is required
for achieving reimbursement. However, a unique
threshold imposes impractical assumptions and
does not account for supply- and demand-side
variations. Based on our review of the arguments
for and against having a single threshold, we
argue that it is necessary for the US researchers
to adopt a variable threshold approach to cost-
effectiveness analysis. This would require the
development of a series of empirically driven
thresholds, recognizing that regional, dynamic,
budgeting and methodological issues will impact
the willingness to pay for a new technology, the
value of a QALY, and, therefore, the optimal
cost-per-QALY threshold.
Medical decision making does and should re-
cognize that each formulary decision is unique
and involves unique treatment alternatives,
health outcomes, patient populations and pre-
ferences. This heterogeneity should influence not
only the ‘value for money’ estimates of novel
treatments but also the inherent acceptability
of the cost-per-QALY that is paid. Until an
improved approach to the analysis of healthcare
decision making can be found, the imperfections
of cost-effectiveness analysis will remain and with
it the need for a variable cost-per-QALY thresh-
old. That threshold should reflect not only on the
specific decision maker but also the context in
which the specific decision is being made.
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